A reexamination of the conglomerate merger wave in the 1960s: an internal capital markets view

Article Abstract:

One possible explanation for bidding firms earning positive abnormal returns in diversifying acquisitions in the 1960s is that internal capital markets were expected to overcome the information deficiencies of the less-developed capital markets. Examining 392 bidder firms during the 1960s, we find the highest bidder returns when financially "unconstrained" buyers acquire "constrained" targets. This result holds while controlling for merger terms and for different proxies used to classify firms facing costly external financing. We also find that bidders generally retain target management, suggesting that management may have provided company-specific operational information, while the bidder provided capital-budgeting expertise. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

Capital market, Capital markets

The value of diversification during the conglomerate merger wave

Article Abstract:

The current trend toward corporate focus reverses the diversification trend of the late 1960s and early 1970s. This article examines the value of diversification when many corporations started to diversify. I find no evidence that diversified companies were valued at a premium over single segment firms during the 1960s and 1970s. On the contrary, there was a large diversification discount during the 1960s, but this discount declined to zero during the 1970s. Insider ownership was negatively related to diversification during the 1960s, but when the diversification discount declined, firms with high insider ownership were the first to diversify. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

Diversification in industry, Industrial diversification

Tobin's Q and the gains from takeovers

Article Abstract:

This paper analyzes the relation between takeover gains and the q ratios of targets and bidders for a sample of 704 mergers and tender offers over the period 1972-1987. Target, bidder, and total returns are larger when targets have low q ratios and bidders have high q ratios. The relation is strengthened after controlling for the characteristics of the offer and the contest. This evidence confirms the results of the work by Lang, Stulz, and Walkling and shows that their findings also hold for mergers and after controlling for other determinants of takeover gains. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

Analysis, Economic research, Lang, L., Stulz, R., Walkling, R.A.